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Bibliografia
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Irvine (2013, no prelo) argumentou que os problemas metodológicos nessa área são tão graves que o termo “consciência” deve ser eliminado do discurso científico como impossível de ser efetivamente operacionalizado ou medido. Feest (2014) e Timmermans e Cleeremans (2015) também destacam os substanciais desafios metodológicos do uso de relatos introspectivos na ciência da consciência, embora sem serem tão pessimistas quanto Irvine.
Irvine (2013, no prelo) argumentou que os problemas metodológicos nessa área são tão graves que o termo “consciência” deve ser eliminado do discurso científico como impossível de ser efetivamente operacionalizado ou medido. Feest (2014) e Timmermans e Cleeremans (2015) também destacam os substanciais desafios metodológicos do uso de relatos introspectivos na ciência da consciência, embora sem serem tão pessimistas quanto Irvine.
== Bibliografia ==
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== Autoria e tradução ==
== Autoria e tradução ==
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