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Isto posto, deveria ser notado que quando desanexada da tese idiossincrática que a mente não existe antes da atualização do pensar, a análise hilemórfica aristotélica do pensamento continua plausível e tem certa independência. A sugestão que o pensamento tem que ser compreendido ao menos parcialmente em termos isomórficos entre nossas capacidades representacionais e os objetos de nossa cognição teve, por uma boa razão, um apelo duradouro. Até o ponto em que hilemorfismo é defensável de maneira geral, sua aplicação neste domínio nos provém uma rica estrutura teórica para a investigação da natureza do pensamento.
Isto posto, deveria ser notado que quando desanexada da tese idiossincrática que a mente não existe antes da atualização do pensar, a análise hilemórfica aristotélica do pensamento continua plausível e tem certa independência. A sugestão que o pensamento tem que ser compreendido ao menos parcialmente em termos isomórficos entre nossas capacidades representacionais e os objetos de nossa cognição teve, por uma boa razão, um apelo duradouro. Até o ponto em que hilemorfismo é defensável de maneira geral, sua aplicação neste domínio nos provém uma rica estrutura teórica para a investigação da natureza do pensamento.


= Desejo =
=Desejo=
Tanto na percepção quanto no pensamento, as almas animais são em certa medidas ativas e passivas. Contudo, a mente e as faculdades sensíveis recebem suas respectivas formas quando pensam e percebem, atividades primordiais que não são integralmente passívas. Percepção envolve discriminação, enquanto pensamento envolve atendimento seletivo e abstração, ambas atividades que requisitam mais que uma mera passividade. Ainda, estas atividades que requerem da cognição e da percepção não explicam de maneira óbvia outra questão fundamental dos seres humanos e outros animais: animais propulsionam a si mesmos pelo espaço para possuírem coisas que desejam. Mesmo nas primeiras caracterizações da alma em De Anima, Aristóteles está atento à vasta noção de que a alma implica a moção (''De Anima'' i 2, 405b11; i 5 409b19–24). Obviamente esta é uma conexão natural que ele faz, dado que todo ser animado, isso é, todo ser com alma, tem entre seus princípios a moção e o repouso. Então, é intrínseco aos seres vivos que eles sejam capazes de mobilizarem a si mesmos de maneiras a garantir sua sobrevivência e florescimento. Animais mobilizam a si mesmos, porém, de maneira distinta: eles desejam coisas, com a resultante de que o desejo é a implicação central de todas as maneiras de ação dos animais. Por que um avestruz corre de um tigre? Porque, responderão facilmente, ela deseja sobreviver então engaja-se num comportamento de fuga. Por que um humano se dirige a uma ópera e lá senta-se em silêncio? Porque, ao que parece, ele deseja ouvir música e observar o espetáculo.
Tanto na percepção quanto no pensamento, as almas animais são em certa medidas ativas e passivas. Contudo, a mente e as faculdades sensíveis recebem suas respectivas formas quando pensam e percebem, atividades primordiais que não são integralmente passívas. Percepção envolve discriminação, enquanto pensamento envolve atendimento seletivo e abstração, ambas atividades que requisitam mais que uma mera passividade. Ainda, estas atividades que requerem da cognição e da percepção não explicam de maneira óbvia outra questão fundamental dos seres humanos e outros animais: animais propulsionam a si mesmos pelo espaço para possuírem coisas que desejam. Mesmo nas primeiras caracterizações da alma em De Anima, Aristóteles está atento à vasta noção de que a alma implica a moção (''De Anima'' i 2, 405b11; i 5 409b19–24). Obviamente esta é uma conexão natural que ele faz, dado que todo ser animado, isso é, todo ser com alma, tem entre seus princípios a moção e o repouso. Então, é intrínseco aos seres vivos que eles sejam capazes de mobilizarem a si mesmos de maneiras a garantir sua sobrevivência e florescimento. Animais mobilizam a si mesmos, porém, de maneira distinta: eles desejam coisas, com a resultante de que o desejo é a implicação central de todas as maneiras de ação dos animais. Por que um avestruz corre de um tigre? Porque, responderão facilmente, ela deseja sobreviver então engaja-se num comportamento de fuga. Por que um humano se dirige a uma ópera e lá senta-se em silêncio? Porque, ao que parece, ele deseja ouvir música e observar o espetáculo.


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Aristóteles apresenta certa hesitação ao discutir sobre o desejo e sua relação com a razão prática na etiologia das ações animais. Alguns, em consequência disto, concluíram que sua abordagem pode ser considerada no melhor dos casos rudimentar, ou pior, aturdida. Parece não haver base para críticas tão duras. Provavelmente Aristóteles é simplesmente sensível às nuances que envolvem a abordagem das questões relacionadas à filosofia da ação. Diferentemente de muitos seguidores de Hume, ele evidentemente reconhece o fato deste domínio ser instável e oscilante enquanto abordagem de uma teoria taxonómica. Os antecedentes da ação, ele conclui, envolvem algum tipo de faculdade do desejo; mas ele é relutante em concluir que o desejo em si é suficiente para implicar uma explicação do comportamento intencional. De alguma maneira, ele também conclui que a razão prática e a imaginação conjuntamente desempenham um papel indispensável.
Aristóteles apresenta certa hesitação ao discutir sobre o desejo e sua relação com a razão prática na etiologia das ações animais. Alguns, em consequência disto, concluíram que sua abordagem pode ser considerada no melhor dos casos rudimentar, ou pior, aturdida. Parece não haver base para críticas tão duras. Provavelmente Aristóteles é simplesmente sensível às nuances que envolvem a abordagem das questões relacionadas à filosofia da ação. Diferentemente de muitos seguidores de Hume, ele evidentemente reconhece o fato deste domínio ser instável e oscilante enquanto abordagem de uma teoria taxonómica. Os antecedentes da ação, ele conclui, envolvem algum tipo de faculdade do desejo; mas ele é relutante em concluir que o desejo em si é suficiente para implicar uma explicação do comportamento intencional. De alguma maneira, ele também conclui que a razão prática e a imaginação conjuntamente desempenham um papel indispensável.
= Notas =
=Notas=
1 Todos os nomes de obras de Aristóteles foram mantidos conforme o manuscrito original.
1 Todos os nomes de obras de Aristóteles foram mantidos conforme o manuscrito original.


Linha 114: Linha 114:


4 Não incluído nesta versão.
4 Não incluído nesta versão.
= Bibliografia =
=Bibliografia=
== Textos, traduções e comentário ==
==Textos, traduções e comentário==
Aquinas, Thomas, 1999. A Commentary in Aristotle's De Anima, translated by
Aquinas, Thomas, 1999. A Commentary in Aristotle's De Anima, translated by Robert Pasnau. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Robert Pasnau. New Haven: Yale University Press.
 
Apohastle, Hippocrates, 1981. Aristotle's On the Soul, Grinell, Iowa: Peripatetic
Apohastle, Hippocrates, 1981. Aristotle's On the Soul, Grinell, Iowa: Peripatetic Press.
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Beare, J. I. and Ross, G.R.T., 1908. The Parva Naturalia, Oxford: Clarendon
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Hamlyn, D.W. [1968] 1993. Aristotle De Anima, Books II and III (with
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passages from Book I), translated with Introduction and Notes by D.W. Hamlyn,
 
with a Report on Recent Work and a Revised Bibliography by Christopher
Hicks, Robert Drew, 1907. Aristotle, De Anima, with translation, introduction and notes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shields, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (First edition, 1968.).
 
Hicks, Robert Drew, 1907. Aristotle, De Anima, with translation, introduction
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Lawson-Tancred, H., 1986 Aristotle: De Anima, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Lawson-Tancred, H., 1986 Aristotle: De Anima, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Rodier, G., 1900. Aristote: Traité de l’âme, Paris: Leux.
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Ross, G.R.T., 1906. Aristotle, De Sensu and De Memoria, text and translation,
 
with introduction and commentary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Ross, W.D., 1955. Aristotle: Parva Naturalia, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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Sorabji, R., 1972. Aristotle on Memory, London: Duckworth.
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Anthologies and Monographs
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Beare, J.I., 1906. Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition: From Alcmaeon to
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Aristotle's Psychology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2010... http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/aristotle-psychology/
==Artigos e capítulos de livro==
Stratton, George Malcolm, 1917. Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological
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Barker, A, 1981. ‘Aristotle on Perception and Ratios,’ Phronesis, 26: 248–66.
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of the Aristotelian Society, 72 (1971/72): 101–14. Reprinted in Barnes,
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Schofield, and Sorabji 1979, 32–41.
 
Berti, Enrico, 1978. ‘The Intellection of Indivisibles according to Aristotle,’ in
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Birondo, Noell, 2001. ‘Aristotle on Illusory Perception,’ Ancient Philosophy,
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Block, Irving, 1960. ‘Aristotle and the Physical Object,’ Philosophy and
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–––, 1961. ‘Truth and Error in Aristotle's Theory of Sense Perception,’
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Philosophical Quarterly, 11: 1–9.
 
–––, 1965. ‘On the Commonness of the Common Sensibles,’ Australasian
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Bolton, R, 1978. ‘Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul: De Anima, II, 1–3,’
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Bradshaw, D, 1997. ‘Aristotle on Perception: The Dual-Logos Theory,’
Bradshaw, D, 1997. ‘Aristotle on Perception: The Dual-Logos Theory,’ Apeiron, 30: 143–61.
Apeiron, 30: 143–61.
 
Broackes, Justin, 1999. ‘Aristotle, Objectivity and Perception,’ Oxford Studies
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Broadie, Sarah, 1992. ‘Aristotle's Perceptual Realism,’ in Ellis 1992, 137–59.
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–––, 1996. ‘Nous, and Nature in Aristotle's De Anima, III,’ Proceedings of the
 
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 12: 163–76.
–––, 1996. ‘Nous, and Nature in Aristotle's De Anima, III,’ Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 12: 163–76.
Burnyeat, Myles. [1992] 1995. ‘Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still
 
Credible? (A Draft),’ in Nussbaum and Rorty [1992] 1995, 15–26.
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–––, 1995. ‘How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle
 
C? Remarks on De Anima, 2. 7–8,’ in Nussbaum and Rorty 1995, 421–34.
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–––, 2002. ‘De Anima, II, 5,’ Phronesis, 47, 28-90.
–––, 2002. ‘De Anima, II, 5,’ Phronesis, 47, 28-90.
Bynum, T.W, 1987. ‘A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception,’ The
 
History of Philosophy Quarterly, 4: 163–78.
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Cashdollar, S, 1973. ‘Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception,’ Phronesis,
 
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–––, 1996. ‘Why Aristotle Needs Imagination,’ Phronesis, 41: 20–55.
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Este verbete se trata de uma tradução de outro verbete chamado: "Aristotle Psychology" da Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - publicado em 11/01/2000 e revisado em 23/08/2010-, feita, com a autorização da instituição detentora dos direitos, por André Elias Morreli e Yuri Pereira. Por se tratar de uma tradução, este verbete ficara fechado por um período de 1 ano, até o dia 09/09/2021.
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